Abstract-Sensors are commonly deployed in hostile environment, and consequently a number of research works have focused on data aggregation schemes designed to be tolerant to attacks on sensor nodes. In parallel, schemes ensuring the confidentiality of sensor data have been proposed to address the emerging privacy concerns. We note that resilience against tampering attacks requires access to the sensor node's data, while in privacy-preserving systems this data must remain confidential. In this work, we aim to reconcile these two seemingly conflicting objectives. We present a novel private and resilient aggregation system, in which an aggregator combines the data collected from sensor nodes and forwards the resulting sum to an analyst. Our scheme protects the privacy of the users from both honest-butcurious aggregator and analyst, while enabling the filtering of fake data values using a Private Range Test protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sensor networks and smart metering systems are becoming increasingly popular. The payload of these networks is often highly sensitive for the users and the absence of security or privacy features has enabled researchers to demonstrate significant privacy leaks in such networks [2] , [13] . However, any security and privacy solution has to consider the potentially conflicting goals of the analyst and the end user. First, the analyst expects to receive useful data from a group of deployed sensors. Therefore, it should be possible to link the sensors to the data they are providing to the system or, as a minimum requirement, a set of sensors controlled by the attacker should not be able to alter the quality of the information delivered to the analyst. The end-users wish to protect their privacy and avoid profiling and de-anonimization, therefore they expect the analyst to have access only to coarse grained information. Our work aims to reconcile the requirements of both parties, in the context of sensor networks performing data aggregation.
Data aggregation enables a trade-off between communication and computation costs, and is often used in sensor networks to save energy or improve capacity. The values of the sensors are combined by an aggregator, and the result is then sent to the analyst for further processing. Numerous works [16] , [8] , [3] , [15] , [4] have targeted independently the resilience or the privacy aspects of data aggregation schemes, but very few have attempted to solve both problems at the same time. In our work, resilient aggregation ensures the robustness of the aggregation result in the presence of fake sensor readings. Indeed, nodes are deployed in an hostile environment and, in addition to potentially being faulty, are vulnerable to attacks. An adversary that controls a node can send fake readings to the aggregator and influence the result to his advantage. A solution supported by many research works consists of verifying that the reported values belong to a predetermined valid range. This is potentially highly intrusive, if it is done on plaintext data.
In parallel, solutions to preserve privacy using homomorphic encryption have been proposed. Here, the aggregator does not have access to plaintext sensor data and aggregation is performed by combining encrypted sensor data values. However, this step in the (right) direction of privacy prevents the aggregator from inspecting the data to determine whether it is in the valid range. This paper addresses the challenge of enabling the verification of the range of encrypted data values prior to using them in the aggregation.
We consider a flat sensor network architecture, in which all sensors are directly connected to an aggregator that collects and combines the received values, before sending the aggregate to an analyst. The sensors can be controlled by an attacker and send fake values to influence the final result. Our contribution focuses on aggregation functions based on the sum operation.
Our contributions are as follows. We propose a system that provides private and resilient data aggregation, based on additive homomorphic encryption and Private Range Test. The former enables data aggregation while ensuring data confidentiality. Private Range Test allows the aggregator to test if an encrypted data lies in a given interval, without having to access the plaintext or gaining any additional information other than the result of the test. In the proposed system, the values reported by the sensors are individually verified using the Private Range Test. We then propose an optimization of the system to reduce the verification cost by the Aggregated Private Range Test (effective for scenarios with a small number of compromized nodes, i.e. up to 17), however with some reduction of accuracy. We have implemented and tested the Private Range Test protocol, demonstrating the practicality of our scheme with a Range Test taking only 108 msec to execute. This paper is an extended abstract of [7] The paper is organized as follows. Section II defines our goal for private and resilient aggregation and the model of adversary. The core idea of our protocol is given in Section III. Performances and practical considerations are discussed in Section IV. Section V gives the position of this work in the literature. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM GOALS AND THE SECURITY MODEL
We are considering a system including: a set of n sensors, an aggregator in charge of aggregating the data received from the sensors and an analyst that must obtain the sum y = where the x i denote the values measured by the sensors. At each round, every sensor transmits a unit of data to the aggregator which in turn transmits the aggregate to the analyst. The system architecture is shown in Fig. 1 .
System architecture comprising an aggregator and an analyst.
Most systems providing privacy preserving aggregation include an aggregator located between the data sources and the analyst. Its role is to aggregate the data received from the data sources and forward the result, y, to the analyst. This architecture has been adopted in several privacy-preserving aggregation solution [1] , [8] , [6] as it allows the distribution of aggregation and decryption tasks to two distinct entities, thus limiting the risk of a privacy breach.
A report is considered as bogus (resp. genuine) when its value is different from (resp. equal to) the real value.
The proposed system aims to satisfy the following objectives:
• Privacy -The internal and external attackers should not be able to access the data of individual sensors.
• Resilience -The system should be tolerant to bogus data sent by the compromised or faulty sensors. Even in the presence of bogus data, the system must still be able to compute the aggregate with a small error margin.
• Complexity -Computational cost for the elements of the system should be as low as possible. In particular the operations performed by the sensors should be in line with the limited computation resources of embedded systems. We make the following hypothesis. First, there is an interval [0, .., q], call the valid interval, in which should fall all genuine data measured by the sensors. This is for instance the case of a number of physical measurements like temperature inside a building, or energy consumption of a household. Thanks to the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme any interval can be shifted to an interval [0, .., q]. Reports falling in the valid interval are said to be valid, and reports that do not fall in this interval are said to be invalid. We assume that a genuine report is always valid, and that a bogus report can be either invalid or valid (a value different from the real value but that remains in the valid range) .
Second, the values x i can be controlled by an attacker, called the correctness attacker, whose goal is to control the aggregated value y. This assumption was the motivation of the seminal of Wagner [15] and it was later used in subsequent works [4] . As nodes are very cheap devices, they are not assumed tamper-resistant: they are an obvious target for the adversary to mount an attack. Let y be the result of the aggregation without the action of an attacker andŷ the aggregation result after the action of the attacker. The error induced by the attack is denoted: ∆ = |y −ŷ|. The goal of the attacker is to maximize the error ∆. To counter this attacker, we aim at designing a system that limits the impact of the attack on the result, i.e. minimize ∆.
Third, there is an attacker, called the privacy attacker whose goal is to obtain information on the sensors' data. This attacker correspond to the aggregator and the analyst that are assumed to be honest-but-curious adversaries, i.e. they are willing to execute correctly the communication protocol but they are interested in getting information on the individual values x i . Therefore, the aggregator is not allowed to manipulate the values x i in the clear. We also assume that the aggregator and the analyst are not colluding.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that these two attackers (the correctness attacker and the privacy attacker) are merged to in the analysis of a data aggregation system.
Finally, we assume that all the cryptographic materials (keys, encryption algorithms, etc.) are already loaded into the sensors. We assume that this step is done through secure channel or other methods. We also assume that there exist secure channels between the aggregator and the analyst.
III. INVALID DATA FILTERING USING RANGE TEST
In this section, we propose a new private and resilient aggregation scheme. The privacy core of our design comes from the use of a partially homomorphic public key cryptosystem as in [12] . We are using an additive homomorphic encryption scheme; we are therefore limited to aggregation functions based on the addition such as the sum or the average.
A. Private range test protocol
The resilience of our scheme relies on the private range test protocol proposed in [10] , [11] . It filters out invalid values while preserving their confidentiality. The private range test RT is a two party protocol in which two non-colluding parties A 1 and A 2 can verify if a ciphertext c lies in a given range [0, .., q] without revealing the plaintext. This protocol requires two homomorphic public key cryptosystems, E 1 (.), D 1 (.) and E 2 (.), D 2 (.), which private keys are held by the analyst. Only the first cryptosystem is used by the sensors to encrypt their data. The second cryptosystem is employed by the aggregator and the analyst for the range test protocol. Let us denote RT (A 1 , A 2 , c, [0, .., q] ) the invocation of a range test protocol between A 1 and A 2 . The function returns TRUE if c belongs to [0, .., q] and FALSE otherwise. In the rest of the paper, A 1 refers to the aggregator and A 2 to the analyst.
B. Proposed system
Our system is presented in Fig. 2 and uses the following protocol composed of four steps: 1) Data encryption: each sensor takes the sensed value x i , encrypts it with the analyst public key and an thanks to the homomorphic properties of the cryptosystem and sends the aggregated result to the analyst A 2 . 4) Result decryption: The analyst A 2 decrypts the aggregated result received from the aggregator A 1 . This result is the sum of the valid values transmitted by the sensors. During the protocol, the individual values are tested but never revealed to the analyst neither to the aggregator thanks to the range test [10] , [11] . They only know if individual values lie on a given interval or not.
Algorithm 1 Data Filtering
Require: [0..q], {c 1 , . . . , c n } Ensure: ∀ c ∈ V, c ∈ [0, .., q] V ← ∅ for each c ∈ {c 1 , . . . , c n } do if RT(A 1 , A 2 , c, [0, .., q]) = TRUE then V ← V ∪ {c} end if end for
C. Aggregated Range-Test
As noted before, the verification step puts the aggregator and the analyst under a heavy computational load as they are performing a range test on each ciphertext. To keep this load as low as possible, we envision a system in which the number of range tests is reduced by performing a partial aggregation before the verification step [7] . The ciphertexts are divided and aggregated by subgroups before being submitted to the range test on a larger interval. Each subgroup is submitted to a q-homogeneous range test; i.e. a subgroup composed of r values {x i } 1≤i≤r is tested on the interval [0, .., rq] (rather than on [0, .., q] for the basic approach). This approach reduced the number of range-test by a factor r but at the same time increase the error that an attacker could introduce in the final result.
IV. SYSTEM ANALYSIS

A. Bound on the aggregate error
Lets consider the case in which our system compute the average of the values sensed by n sensors. Lets further assume that the true value sensed by all the sensors is equal to zero and that there is a correctness attacker controling k sensors, whose goal is to maximise the aggregate. For each of the k nodes controled by the attacker, it will send the value that will maximise the aggregate whitout being detected and discarded by the range test. In our case, this maximum value is q. This will create an error on the sum equal to δ = k.q and the error on the average will be ∆ = δ/n = k.q/n. This ensure that the cost of an attack (the number of compromised sensors) is proportionnal to the amplitude of the error on the aggregate. Without the ciphertext verification, a single compromised sensor is enough to produce an error of arbitrary amplitude.
B. Data privacy
Our system is based on a homomorphic cryptosystem that prevent any entity other than the analyst to decrypt the data produced by the sensors. In addition, the raw encrypted values are only available at the aggregator. Therefore, assuming that the aggregator and the analyst are not colluding, our proposal guarantees the privacy of the sensors' data.
C. Complexity
Up to our knowledge, this is the first time that private range tests are applied in practice, and there is currently no official implementation of these tests. In Table I , we give a first evaluation of the computational cost of a range test in term of number of operations. As encryption/decryption operations are much more expensive than addition and multiplication (due to the use of underlying modified El-Gamal cryptosystem), we sum up the computational complexity in terms of encryption/decryption operations. A test has a significant cost: our approach to reduce the number of test executions is therefore justified. To know how practical is our scheme, we have implemented a range test. Our implementation used the El-Gamal cryptosystem with 1024-bit keys. The implementation was done using GMP 5.0.2 and GCC version 4.6.3 on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 processor. For t = 1, a range test is executed in 108ms.
For the data producer (e.g. sensors), the main complexity is the implementation of El-Gamal cryptosystem. The elliptic curves El-Gamal cryptosystem has been already investigated for sensors in [14] and is fully feasible. It also benefits from the support of TINYECC [9] .
V. RELATED WORKS
The issue of corrupted or faulty sensors sending bogus reports has been originaly considered by Wagner [15] and later by Buttyan et al. [4] . Those works present aggregation systems that are robust against faulty or compromised sensors, but they do not consider the privacy aspects.
Systems ensuring privacy have been built using homomorphic encryption [16] , [8] or secure multiparty computation [3] . In those systems, each node encrypts or encodes its value 38th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks before sending it to the analyst, either directly or through a set of intermediate forwarders and aggregators. In those works, the problem of resilience against malicious or faulty sensors is simply ignored because the encryption prevents any verification on the data. Finally we note that [5] presents a solution for secure aggregation in wireless sensor networks. The presented system supports a privacy preserving aggregation mechanism as well as an integrity verification that enable the sink to detect with a high probability the presence of bogus data in the aggregate. When the integrity check fails, the aggregated value must be discarded, and it is not possible to neither identify nor isolate the source(s) of the bogus data as our proposal allows . As a consequence, this system is vulnerable to denial of service attack in which an isolated sensor can inject bogus data in each aggregate making the result useless.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a private and resilient data aggregation system based on a private range test. This system allows to preserve privacy of the data while verifying that an attacker controlling a subset of the sensors has a limited impact on the aggregated data. This approach could be compared with the notion of accountability of the end-users as done for example in [12] , even if the verification is not done on individual values but on sub-aggregates.
We have considered in the paper bogus readings from the sensors which attempt to influence the sum obtained by the analyst. It would be interesting to consider a scenario in which some sensors collude with the analyst in order to threaten the privacy of a particular user. Application of our scheme to other aggregation functions such as the median, minimum and maximum would be worth investigating.
